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Published:
When the OECD released their 2015 Fragility Report I remember looking at the penta-Venn Diagram of the different states of fragility and wondering why Afghanistan was not fragile in institutions, which was supposed to capture corruption among other governance issues. This question eventually led to a Monkey Cage post on my attempt to replicate their measures of fragility.
The OECD responded in a comment to the initial posting pointing out some problems with my replication while admitting certain errors. However, after a revised replication that incorporates those edits, all up on Github, I still get very different results.
I look forward to seeing OECD’s 2016 report as they have discussed some interesting revisions to their measure of fragility. Hopefully along with substantive improvements they will also incorporate improve their methodology especially by way of transparency. As the OECD continues to work with this data in order to provide a public good, the greatest good will come from being as public as possible.
Published:
The latest Freakonomics episode, How Many Doctors Does It Take to Start a Healthcare Revolution, Jeffrey Brenner, executive director and founder of the Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers, uses Princeton, NJ as an example of over active hospital financing. The Coalition is currently working JPAL on an RCT of an care management program targeting healthcare system “super-utilizers” identified by healthcare “hotspotting”. From the transcript:
BRENNER: One of the problems is that we have a giant economic bubble underlying this where we have hospital financing authorities underpinning, that are run by states that help hospitals float bonds. And we have this giant bond market called the hospital bond market that’s considered very secure, very safe, good investment. And you know, that bond market has floated too much hospital capacity and created and brought online too many hospital beds, far more hospital beds than we need in America. So you know, the most dangerous thing in America is an empty hospital bed. In the center of New Jersey, near Princeton, a couple years ago, we built two brand-new hospitals. These are two $1 billion hospitals, 10 miles apart, very close to Princeton. So one is called Capital Health, and the other is Princeton Medical Center. I don’t remember anyone in New Jersey voting to build two brand-new hospitals. But we are all going to be paying for that the rest of our lives. We’ll pay for it in increased rates for health insurance. And, boy, you better worry if you go to one of those emergency rooms, because the chances of being admitted to the hospital when there are empty beds upstairs that they need to fill are going to be much, much higher than when all the beds are full–whether there’s medical necessity or you need it or not. So I’d be very worried if you live in Princeton that there are now two $1 billion hospitals waiting to be filled by you.
The RCT is fascinating, but also interested me since I spent two years volunteering with Princeton First Aid and Rescue on the ambulance taking patients to the $520 million Princeton Medical Center, opened in 2012.1
I do not recall taking anyone to the Capital Health Medical Center - Hopewell, opened in 2011, but Capital Health Regional Medical Center in Trenton was our go to trauma center. To get an idea of the layout, the map below shows the Regional Medical Center in red, the two new hospitals in green, and the old Princeton Medical Center in Orange.2
Map of past and current hospitals in the Princeton area.
The hospital construction was also brought up in a 2014 NYT article asking why a procedure in retired math professor was billed $5,435 at the Princeton medical center and $1,714 in Boston for the same procedure:
But that cost must cover some expenses in the United States not found in other medical systems. The area around Princeton has had a spate of new hospital building in the past five years. The University Medical Center of Princeton at Plainsboro, which has no connection to Princeton University, cost more than $500 million to build and has a curving atrium decorated with artwork from the hospital’s permanent collection. “It was like a luxurious museum,” Mr. Charlap said.
University Medical Center of Princeton at Plainsboro: curved for your health
I know little about health care finances and have no strong feelings about the hospital construction, which seems like it isn’t even the biggest factor in rising health care costs. I am happy to see that people are thinking about and questioning the status quo.
For my two cents, I felt that I transported many patients that did not really need an emergency room, not out of any financial interest but because of protocols. If a patient wanted to go to the hospital, I wasn’t qualified to refuse him or her by judging the trip unnecessary. Similarly, if a patient did not want to go to the hospital, they can deemed unqualified to refuse for a number of reasons including alcohol use. Often is seemed someone was of sound mind even after a couple drinks, but when there are liability concerns why risk releasing a not sober but medically sound student who could then turn around and sue you when he later electrocutes himself on the Dinky, Princeton’s iconoclastic rail car? The rules of when to transport is probably a relatively small factor in the larger world of health care costs, but from my view in the back of the ambulance it would also be worth a rigorous evaluation.
FOOTNOTES:
Published:
Alternative internet tabloid title: “7 Ways Afghanistan Kicks America’s Butt!”
Unemployment, insecurity, and corruption, are the biggest challenges facing Afghanistan according to the ASIA Foundation’s 2014 survey. The fraud allegations and controversial recount of the presidential run-off election might have made the list, but the survey ran before the preliminary vote totals were released.
Even before the elction though, pessimism was on the rise. The survey found that 40% of Afghans believe the country is moving in the wrong direction, a new high since the ASIA Foundation began surveying in 2004. If you are keeping up with US politics however, that number doesn’t look so bad. Throughout 2014, over 60% of Americans have reported that the country is headed down the wrong track.
Of course, when comparing across surveys you have to account for many factors such as different methodologies, sampling limitations, exact phrasing, and cultural significance. We cannot say that America’s track is more wrong than Afghanistan’s, whatever that even means. However, I believe these comparisons should make us think about both the face value comparison (why might Americans be more pessimistic?) and the issues of doing such a comparison in the first place (how is the data shaped by differences in culture, society, history, politics, economics, linguistics, and the survey methodology itself?).
With the goal of promoting additional thinking, I present the seven survey results where Afghanistan outperforms the USA:
1. Right Direction
On the other side of wrong-track coin, 54.7% of Afghans believe that the country is moving in the right direction. This is a slight dip from 2013, but overall still seems to be on a steady climb since 2008. In the United States you have to go back to 2009 in the Reuter’s Poll or 2003 in the NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll to find that level of optimism in the US (see graph by Marist Poll).
2. Property Crime
Security is a major concern in Afghanistan; 16% of respondents report that they or someone in their family had suffered from violence or crime in the past year. Overall, violent acts (beatings, suicide attacks, murder, kidnapping, militant action, etc.) were more prevalent than property crime (Racketeering, livestock theft, pick-pocketing, burglary, vehicle theft). Between 6.5 and 13% of respondents reported some type of property crime (exact unknown because respondents were allowed to report two types). In comparison, the violent crime rate in the US in 2013 was only 2.3% according to the USA’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). However, the US may have a slightly higher rate of property crime - 13.1% of households.
3. Crime Reporting
The first response on property crime might be about what incidents go unreported. While Americans and Afghans may have different ideas on what constitutes a criminal act, as it is Afghanistan has a higher reporting rate than the US. The BJS estimated that Americans reported 46% of violent crime and 36% of property crime to police. In Afghanistan reporting of crime or violence increased this year to 69%.
4. Confidence in the Police
The difference in crime reporting may be related to each country’s confidence in their police. When a 2014 Gallup poll asked Americans how much confidence they have in the police 53% selected a great deal or quite a lot versus the other choices: some, very little, or none. The ASIA Foundation’s survey found 73.2% are confident in the Afghan National Police (ANP). This is using a composite measure of people that agree strongly or agree somewhat with three statements: the ANP (a) is honest and fair (b) improves security and (c) is efficient at making arrests. As more direct comparisons, 86% of Afghans strongly agreed or somewhat agreed that the ANP improve security; according to a Pew Poll 83% of Americans said that police were excellent, good, or only fair at protecting people from crime. Similarly, 88% of Afghans at strongly or somewhat agreed that the ANP is honest and fair, while 74% of Americans gave the police a fair or better rating at treating racial and ethnic groups equally.
5. Confidence in the Army
The higher levels of confidence in the police may be related to their role in fighting the insurgency. The Afghan National Army (ANA) similarly garners a high level of confidence. Using a composite measure again, 86.5% of Afghans agree strongly or agree somewhat with all three of the three following statements: that the ANA (a) is honest and fair (b) improves security and (c) protects civilians. The most recent 2014 Gallup Poll found 74% of Americans have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the US military.
6. Confidence in the Legislature
In 2013 the US congress’ ratings hit record lows; a Public Policy Polling survey found that Americans had higher opinions of root canals, head lice, traffic jams, cockroaches, and Nickelback. Gallup polls that year found that 10% of Americans had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in Congress. This number dipped to 7% in 2014. Afghanistan cleanly clears this low bar with 12% reporting a lot of confidence in parliament as a whole.
7. Fair Elections
Before the announcement of the run-off election and the subsequent allegations of sheep stuffing and disputes over unity governments, the Afghan people were quite bullish on the elections. When asked about them, 63% responded that they were in general free and fair. If you ask likely American voters, only 40% think elections are fair to voters. Given what has happened since the US may have taken back the lead on fair-election perceptions, but that’s still not something to brag about.
Published:
In mid-November the international community was still seriously concerned about Ebola and its effects on West Africa. Some prominent figures even called Ebola a threat to international peace. My realist/cynical side figured the calls might simply be an attempt to raise awareness and aid, but I was intrigued by the question, has disease ever led to war?
In my Foreign Policy piece (USIP mirror) I examine the literature on how disease could directly or indirectly lead to war. The short answer is that disease does not lead to war, but depending on the exact effect of an epidemic and government’s response, disease could lead to other forms of conflict.
Two sections were cut for the final version of the article. First, we cut out the research on whether economic shocks lead to conflict using rainfall as an instrumental variable. This growing body of literature launched by Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti is fascinating, but trying to explain instrumental variables proved unwieldy in such a compact article.
The other section was a quick data probe inspired by a report by the US Institute of Peace from 2001 that discussed how HIV/AIDS could lead to conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. I pulled UNAIDS figures on the national prevelance of HIV/AIDS in 2001 and UCDP/PRIO data on whether a country experienced civil war in from 2002 to 2012. Dividing the countries up into quartiles based on the prvalence of HIV/AIDS gives the following figure:
If HIV/AIDS increased the possibility of conflict, we would expect that those with the highest rates of HIV/AIDS would be the most likely to experience conflict. However, I find that those countries with the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in 2001 also were the least likely to experience a conflict in the 10 years after. While not particularly rigorous or scientific, this simple data exercise challenges some assumptions and raises some questions.
Published:
I’m happy to introduce UCDPtools, an R package for accessing data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). UCDPtools includes UCDPindex that makes it easy to move around the websites and codebooks for the 15 UCDP datasets and the function getUCDP() that loads the datasets into R and fixes obvious errors and variable names.
browseURL(UCDPindex$codebook_link[UCDPindex$shortname=="One-Sided"])
onesided <- getUCDP("One-Sided", rawdata=TRUE, rawnames=TRUE)
The package is hosted on my github page and can be easily installed using the devtools package:
install.packages("devtools")
library(devtools)
install_github("tlscherer/UCDPtools", dependencies=TRUE)
library(UCDPtools)
data(UCDPindex)
I hope UCDPtools can become a one stop shop for tools and tricks for working with the UCDP datasets in R. Future iterations will have the datasets with different units, for example a year-actor version of “ArmedConflict” with a conflict count. If you have some code you would like to contribute, please contact me. Thanks to Jonathan Olmsted for assistance in packaging and Stephen Haptonstahl for making packages seem possible. All bugs are my own.
Archive Tags: Computer Tricks
Published:
In exploring the GDELT dataset around disasters, I found an interesting trend around the tragic Typhoon Haiyan. Looking at events geolocated in the Philippines before and after the typhoon, I found a steep rise in the number of optimistic comments, clearly overtaking a rise in the number of pessimistic comments.
This is just a probing of the GDELT data, which already must be used cautiously, so no conclusions should be drawn. It does suggest possible questions that we can ask about politics and psychology around disasters. More broadly, it raises some other ways to use the GDELT dataset.
Oh, and as a quick comparison, there is no clear trend for optimistic / pessimistic comments in India surrounding the destructive but much less deadly Cyclone Phailin.
Published:
Last month the NFPA released several reports on fire losses in 2012. The report Catastrophic Multi-death Fires in 2012 covers the seventeen incidents that had five or more deaths. These incidents make up .001% of the total fires for the year and 2.9% of the total deaths.
The incident with the single largest loss-of-life was not any of the usual suspects such as a building collapse or a gas explosion. It was a series of car accidents due to low visibility from a brush fire near a highway. On January 29th, on Interstate 75 near Gainesville, Florida, 25 vehicles were involved in six crashes that left 11 people dead. The helicopter footage of the aftermath is harrowing but tenable given the visibility captured in the photograph (via Daily Mail UK).
The timeline of that day’s events as fascinating as it is tragic:
The Law Enforcement Incident Review highlights many factors that went wrong here, but I was struck by the meteorological dimension. The sudden drop in visibility was due to a phenomenon called inversion where a shift in the atmosphere’s temperature layers traps smoke. After a similar situation in Florida in 2008 led to a 70 vehicle accident with 4 deaths, the highway patrol updated a checklist for smoke/fog incidents which now included checking the Low Visibility Occurrence Risk Index and getting a spot forecast from the National Weather Service. In 2012, neither of these things were done.
The Interstate 75 catastrophe is neither the worse nor the most recent fire tragedy where the weather played an important role. Just four months ago, in what was the deadliest event for firefighters since the 9-11 attacks, 19 firefighters were lost in the summer wildfires in Yarnell Arizona when the winds changed. My former Cornell bandmate Owen Shieh, now the Weather and Climate Program Coordinator at the National Disaster Preparedness Center, posted an very detailed analysis of what happened and how it could have been avoided, and concludes with the crucial question for emergency decision-making - What else can be done to bridge the gap between the science and the decisions?
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether agencies in Florida are taking the weather more seriously. A year after the Interstate 75 incident, the Florida DOT, Forest Service, and Highway Patrol have reportedly collaborated to make improvements in terms of inter-department communications, cameras to monitor the highway, signage to warn drivers, sensors to monitor traffic speeds, and increased training for responded to fog related accidents.
Published:
I recently attended the PSU GDELT Hackathon where I got a chance to contribute to the R package GDELTtools. The experience inspired me to clean up and share my own explorations of GDELT. My colleague Anna Schrimpf presented a research plan looking at the incentive structure that NGOs like Amnesty International face when choosing which issues to focus on. I found her research agenda fascinating and wondered if it could be applied to different types of conflict.
To check, I took the three UCDP datasets on annual casualties from (1) battles related to civil or interstate war, (2) one-sided government attacks on civilians, and (3) violence between non-state actors from 1989 and 2011 and plotted total fatalities against the count of Media-reported NGO actions using GDELT. For each country-year, I count the number of actions by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, or the Red Cross that target an actor of that country in that year. The resulting plot below contains 2500 points spread across 170 countries.
Immediately Rwanda 1994 jumps out as an outlier with over 800,000 deaths and the USA in 2011 with over 1500 NGO actions. Zooming in to the area outlined in purple gives the following plot:
Again we have points along each axis. Along the Y-axis we see USA and Israel joining more tumultuous countries, about which Ron and Ramos have a nice discussion in Foreign Policy. Across the X-axis we see Sudan, DRCongo, and Ethiopia with many conflict casualties but little NGO targeting.
Any analysis of this data is clearly early and should be approached warily. This is only meant as a probe of GDELT’s potential. That said, I couldn’t resist running a negative binomial regression with the different types of violence and fixed effects by country and year. My expectations are that, controlling for country and year effects:
(H1) NGO action increases with violence
(H2) NGOs react most to violence against civilians (onesided)
(H3) NGOs are more responsive to government violence (onesided and battle)
Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) | ||
(Intercept) | .928 | .223E-01 | 4.155 | 3.25E-05 | *** |
battle1000 | .129 | .0144 | 8.932 | < 2e-16 | *** |
nonstate1000 | .108E | .0597 | 1.812 | 0.070012 | . |
oneside1000 | .0651 | .0122 | 5.335 | 9.57E-08 | *** |
The results shown above suggest support for (H1) and (H3) as non-state violence is the only one not statistically significant at the .01 level. I was surprised at the similar results for battle and onesided deaths, but a quick look at the literature revealed similar findings for battle deaths (see Hafner-Burton and Ron 2012 and Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005).
My own conclusion from this exercise is that GDELT has a lot of potential and will only get better as it is further tested and developed. I am especially excited about combining GDELT data with other datasets such as the UCDP violence data used here, even if doing so does lose GDELT’s temporal power.
Published:
The title is hyperbolic, but it gets to a shortcoming of the UN Security Council’s Resolution 2118 on Syria’s chemical weapons passed last week. It was inspired by reported responses to the resolution.
US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power - This resolution makes clear there will be consequences for noncompliance. US Secretary of State John Kerry - Progress would be reported to the Council, he said, stressing that non-compliance would lead to the imposition of Chapter VII actions.
It is not clear whether Ambassador Power and Secretary Kerry actually believe what they are saying, but to be clear, they should not.
The consequence in question is item 21 of the resolution: “decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”
In reality, this is hardly a consequence. First off, any measures imposed under Chapter VII would require another UNSC resolution, a point that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made clear on a Russian TV interview. Another resolution gives Russia another chance to veto, and an earlier draft of 2118 suggests that Russia’s requirements for action are quite high.
For fun, let’s assume that Russia would be sensitive to criticism if it prohibited a response to another chemical attack after approving 2118. While it is true that the UN’s harshest measures require Chapter VII, the reverse is not true; Chapter VII does not require harsh measures. That is, Russia could put forth a toothless Chapter VII resolution to meet its institutional obligations and still shield Assad.
The Security Council Report wrote in 2008 on the myths of Chapter VII that spells out the range of Chapter VII resolutions. The following line is the most relevant to the situation:
In some cases, the Council invokes Chapter VII (for purely political purposes) but with no intent to impose binding obligations.
Ultimately, if we do see another chemical attack by the regime, the UN would find itself in a position similar to where President Obama was in early September - having its vague threat challenged with little chance of backing it up in a meaningful way. Let us hope that Assad is a man of his word.
Published:
In the last two weeks a happenstance agreement on Syria's chemical weapons has changed the discussion from 'what should we do' to 'what just happened'. Here's another attempt to break down the underlying questions and arguments. I do not think we will see again the kind of policy debate we saw around possible strikes, so my review of news and events here has more information than arguments.
What happened?
Sept 9th - John Kerry's rhetorical comment
Sept 13th - Kerry and Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
Sept 14th - Deal reached
Sept 20th - Syria submits inventory [NYT]
What does the deal do?
Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will draft procedures for CW disposal and verification
Includes destruction of production equipment and delivery systems
UN Security Council resolution with regular reviews of Syria
Will impose Chapter VII measures if Syria noncompliant
Syria must give access to OPCW and UN
Timeline:
Expected to submit listing of all items today, Sept. 21
Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections by November
Destruction of production and mixing/fillingby November
Elimination of all CW and CW equipment by first half of 2014
Solves Obama's dilemma.
Gold star for Putin.
Assad buys time.
Did US threat of "incredibly small" strike make Syria agree to concessions?
Rebels lose hope of US strike on Assad.
Winners and losers depends on reference point [Drezner]
Further Information on Strikes
Found evidence of Sarin in samples of environment and patients
Does not attribute blame
Of 5 impact sites, 2 gave likely trajectories.
HRW mapped the trajectories, suggesting they originated from a Republican Guard brigade
Theories on Assad's usage of CW [PV@G]
Signal toughness
Signal disregard for international norms
Remove uncertainty about USA intervention
German intelligence attributes attack to regime but not to Assad [Guardian]
What's next?
Syria's deputy prime minister says that the conflict is a stalemate
Assad will call for a ceasefirewith international observation [Guardian]
Government's position: end of external intervention, peaceful political process
Rebel position: Assad ouster and transitional government.
Rebel group conflict - Free Syrian Army fighting Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
jihadist groups showing greater deference to local population
Jihadist groups
Agreement
Timeline will be difficult, especially in wartime [CFR Stares]
What else?
Putin made his case to the American public through a NYT op-ed
With many offering counter points [FP, WP]
Putin blames foreign weapons supplied to opposition
But Russia is source of 71% of Syria's arms imports
Putin calls for multilateral approach
But Russia has blocked UN statements on humanitarian concerns
Putin bemoans America's tendency to intervene
But Russia still occupies 20% of Georgia
Putin says "we must not forget that God created us equal"
Does not apply to homosexuals in Russia
BBC has a nice looking overview of the conflict starting with protests
Published:
I like work in OneNote to keep things organized, but moving text to other platforms can run into some formatting issues. Here’s my self-guide for moving a OneNote page to html for this wordpress blog.
For me the transition adds annoying line breaks. You can fix this by going through line by line, or do the following.
This process works pretty well, but I’d love to hear if you found another shortcut.
Archive Tag: Computer Tricks
Published:
I’ve been tasked with helping students understand the Syria crisis and US policy options. Below is the outline of basic facts, key questions and arguments, and interesting sources. The goal was to lay out many of the smaller debates that (ideally) contribute to any policy decision on Syria. Of course many points have been simplified as the infamous Afghanistan powerpoint came to mind.
Syria Timeline:
March 2011 - Protests start
October 2011 - Opposition Syrian National Council Forms
February 2012 - Kofi Annan envoy to Syria
August 2012 - Kofi Annan resigns. US warns Assad about chemical weapons.
Dec 2012 - US, Britain, France recognize opposition National Council as legitimate representation
August 21, 2013 - accusations of chemical attack near Damascus
Parties involved:
Assad Regime
Supported by allies Russia and Iran
Father president since 1971, Bashar took over in 2000.
Opposition [BBC Guide]
100s of groups, small militias, brigades
Syrian National Council is main organization
Radical Islamic groups with ties to Al Qaeda are among strongest
Free Syrian Army is more secular military organization
Broadly supported by Turkey and sunni monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar
United States
"Red Line" of chemical weapons
Recent memories of involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan
Neighboring countries
Refugee crises in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey
Violence in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Israel
Other nations
Strong opposition to action in Britain, Germany [Cowell]
Germany has domestic concerns of economic crisis
Britain sense that Iraq was based on WMD falsehoods
France emboldened by Mali
After domestic pressure, will await UN findings [NYT]
United Nations
Security Council action routinely vetoed by China and Russia
Chemical attack inspectors
Only mandated to determine if chem weapons used, NOT who used them
Why would Assad use chemical weapons?
Could have been unintentional
US proof is panicked phone calls from Syria Ministry of Defense to Chem Unit demanding answers
Send signal that regime will defend capital at any cost [Cole]
Why do chemical weapons get a stronger reaction than conventional weapons?
Brian Price looks at historical perception of chemical weapons:
Indiscriminate, weapon that cannot be defended against, a weapon of the weak, and an uncivilized weapon.
Also has institutional legacy
What are the possible motives for intervention, and the appropriate action for each?
Deter further chemical use
If targeted right, could influence individual soldier decisions [DeMeritt]
Action A: Small-scale symbolic strike. [Betts, Kristof]
Action B: Judicial action such as International War Crimes Tribunal?
Degrade chemical capabilities
Delivery methods of rockets and artillery
NOT targeting chem storage because of humanitarian and environmental consequences
Action A: Severe damage?
Weaken or Punish Assad
Change Assad's policy and/or end conflict
Intervention boosts morale or opposition, but legitimizes Assad [Szekely]
Action A: Severe damage. [Betts]
Assad regime has shown high tolerance of pain [Chris Harmer]
Action B: Judicial action such as International War Crimes Tribunal [Friedman]
Action C: Arm rebels [Friedman]
Overthrow Assad
Action A: Large scale, severe military intervention
+ victory for Assad is victory for Iran [Rep. Cantor]
- would leave Syria as a failed state [Walt]
Signal WMD norm to world
Action A: Verification of use and exhaust other options before force [Carpenter]
Action B: Judicial action such as International War Crimes Tribunal?
Action C: International outrage has already reinforced norm [Price]
Action D: Military force [Rep. Cantor]
Prevent Civilian Deaths
Syrians dying, Al Qaeda gaining, region destabilizing
But people have been dying for long time, why now?
Action A: Multilateral with right intention and appropriate method [Carpenter]
Action B: Strikes could degrade governments ability to kill [Kristof]
Action C: Increase Relief Aid [Walt]
Demonstrate US credibility
Action A: Small-scale symbolic strike?
+ signal resolve to use military action to Iran, North Korea, etc. [Petraeus]
- domestic heat already makes Obama more credible [Mercer]
End Conflict
As conflict continues, Syrians die, Al Qaeda gains, and region destabilizes [Kristof]
BUT intervention might destabilize or widen conflict [Szekely, Italy]
Action A: Land invasion
Action B:Support political process [CrisisGroup]
Military interventions must reinforce a political plan. [De Wall & Conley-Zilkec]
Action C: Strikes could make government negotiate [Kristof]
Appease/distract domestic audiences
Action A: Small-scale symbolic strike?
Is an intervention legal? Does legality matter?
Action without UNSC approval is against international law [Hurd,Hathaway and Shapiro]
R2P is widely accepted, but lacks force of law[Hurd]
That action is illegal doesn't prevent action [Hurd]
Must act as "illegal but legitimate" or "constructive noncompliance"
Obama should declare that international law has evolved beyond SC approval
Use of force without UNSC approval endangers the international order [Hathaway & Shapiro]
- Drezner is skeptical that UN is necessary for peace
- Voeten argues that UN approval is not imperative, already full of holes
What can we learn from past interventions?
Academia speaks:
What are the US domestic issues involved?
Bellwether of US foreign policy [NYT]
Iran may read congress's decision as USA's stomach for military action
Putting it to a vote
Obama has said that he is looking to build unity and enhance legitimacy [NYT]
Critics have said that Obama is passing the buck.
Appropriate to ask Congress before setting new precedent of executive power [Dellinger]
Does public opinion matter?
Hindsight, 20/20?
If trying to avoid conflict Obama should not have made threats that it couldn't back [Black]
Cannot have a punishment that is declared limited and the end of involvement. [Ulfelder]
In poker, it is trying to drive your opponent off a pot with a modest bet and weak cards
Other links of interest
CFR's Sept. 3rd round up of CFR member opinions
Taylor Marvin's good overview of discussion and recent links
Youtube videos shown to congress (explicit)
What can we do?
Write your representative (like Walt did)
You're probably now more informed than your rep is
Published:
While reading Damon Coppola’s Introduction to International Disaster Management, I was struck by the unequivocal denouncement of cost-benefit analyses of disaster mitigation with respect to human life. In listing three criticisms of the process of determining risk acceptability, number two reads:
Setting a dollar figure (in cost-benefit analyses) on a human life is unethical and unconscionable . . . Because of the controversial nature of placing a value on life, it is rare that a risk assessment study would actually quote a dollar figure for the amount of money that could be saved per human life loss accepted. Post-event studies have calculated the dollar figures spent per life during crisis, but to speculate on how much a company or government is willing to spend to save or risk a life would be extremely unpalatable for most.
The emphasis is not mine. I had two initial reactions. First, setting a dollar figure on human life is common practice in many settings. The EPA is a common example, and currently has their carefully defined value of statistical life set at 7.4 million (in 2006 dollars). In an oft cited article, Viscusi and Aldy review over 100 articles that measure how individuals value morbidity risk.
The second thought was to consider who in the emergency management field would benefit or lose from Coppola’s forbidden analysis. My former Princeton colleague Sarah Bush, now an Assistant Professor at Temple University, began quantifying the benefits of NGO democracy promotion programs to keep up with the shifting preferences of their donors. In that transition, there were certainly winners and losers among the NGOs.
Two pieces the last couple week put these questions to a wider audience. First, Peter Singer’s NYT column pitted charity categories against each other resulting in a thought experiment where you would visit a new museum wing if doing so gave you a 0.1% chance of suffering 15 years of blindness. With this bizarre would-you-rather, Singer advocates for the evidence-based approach to charity known as Effective Altruism.
Second, Professor Chris Blattman strongly criticized charities that eschew impact appraisals. In a recent episode of This American Life looking at the best way to give that features Blattman, the vice-president of Heifer International responds to a question about an experiment where one village gets cows and training and another village gets an equivalent amount of cash. She says, “It sounds like an experiment, and we’re not about experiments. These are lives of real people and we have to do what we believe is correct. We can’t make experiments with people’s lives. They’re just– they’re people. It’s too important.”
To Blattman, this is the crux of the matter. He writes, “Let me be blunt: This is the way the Heifers of the world fool themselves. When you give stuff to some people and not to others, you are still experimenting in the world.” Blattman admits that ignoring someone is easier than talking to someone and measuring their outcomes without giving them anything, which may be part of why Heifer feels the latter is immoral. Blattman could not disagree more, saying that in a world with limited resources it is immoral not to take measurements. If in fact a poor family does twice as well with cash than with cattle, then each person Heifer helps is in essence withholding aid from another through opportunity costs. Of course we don’t know if this is the case, but the point is that ignorance is not only bliss, it’s cruel.
Both Singer and Blattman are taking part in the discussion about a new charity, GiveDirectly, but they speak to part of what really bothered me about the paragraph in Coppola. Decision-making in disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, and relief with a cost-benefit analysis that considers human life feels like playing god, choosing who lives and who dies. However, avoiding that analysis does not absolve you from making life and death decisions, you just do so with even less information. We do not know if those uninformed actions may result in the further loss of life, but it seems immoral not to find out.
[Edited for grammar]
Published in The Washington Post, 2014
Nearly two months after Afghans cast their presidential ballots, the electoral battle continues with the possibility of spiraling into violence. Why have the candidates continued to fight?
Recommended citation: Scherer, Thomas Leo (2014, August 12). "Why the Afghanistan Election Still Isn’t Over", The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/12/why-the-afghan-election-still-isnt-over/
Published in Foreign Policy, 2015
Taken cumulatively, the research suggests that while Ebola’s impact on West Africa is unquestionably immense, war is unlikely.
Recommended citation: Scherer, Thomas Leo (2015, February 02). "Is Ebola the New Powder Keg?", Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/02/is-ebola-the-new-powder-keg/
Published in The Washington Post, 2015
In my attempts to replicate the assessment, I found that the OECD misclassified a large number of states, a mistake that could have real-world repercussions.
Recommended citation: Scherer, Thomas Leo (2015, May 17). "The OECD’s fragility index is surprisingly fragile and difficult to reproduce", The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/17/the-oecds-fragility-index-is-surprisingly-fragile-and-difficult-to-reproduce/
Published in USIP Insights, 2015
The effects of economic interventions on violence and stability outcomes are largely unknown.
Recommended citation: Kapstein, Ethan and Thomas Leo Scherer (2015, June). "Economics and Peacebuilding: A Crucial Connection", USIP Insights. http://www.usip.org/economics-and-peacebuilding-crucial-connection
Published in Princeton University, 2015
Governments select into UNPKOs that help them stay in power for longer
Recommended citation: Scherer, Thomas Leo. "Peace for Keeps: Peacekeeping and Civil War Outcomes." Princeton, NJ : Princeton University. (2013). https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/handle/88435/dsp015138jh267
Published in World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2018
This paper presents a novel methodology for observing private sector activity using mobile phone metadata.
Recommended citation: Scherer, Thomas Leo (2018, January 021). "Insecurity and Industrial Organization: Evidence from Afghanistan". World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/929591516198334068/pdf/WPS8301.pdf
Published in The Nonproliferation Review, 2018
The alleged benefits of NFU may be overstated, at least for crisis stability in asymmetric crises.
Recommended citation: Alexander Lanoszka & Thomas Leo Scherer (2017) Nuclear ambiguity, no-first-use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises, The Nonproliferation Review, 24:3-4, 343-355 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2018.1430552?journalCode=rnpr20
Published in Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2020
The SARS-COV-2 global pandemic has exposed weaknesses throughout our institutions, and the sciences are no exception.
Recommended citation: Douglass, R. W., Scherer, T. L., & Gartzke, E. (2020). The Data Science of COVID-19 Spread: Some Troubling Current and Future Trends, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 26(3), 20200053. doi: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0053 https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/peps/26/3/article-20200053.xml
Published in ArXiv preprint, 2022
We introduce a new ontology and dataset of international events called ICBe based on a very high-quality corpus of narratives from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project.
Recommended citation: Douglass, Rex W., Thomas Leo Scherer, J. Andrés Gannon, Erik Gartzke, Jon Lindsay, Shannon Carcelli, Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al. "Introducing the ICBe Dataset: Very High Recall and Precision Event Extraction from Narratives about International Crises." arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.07081 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.07081
Analyzing crisis dynamics through event data
Expanding IR datasets through wikidata
Published:
From my dissertation, on how UN Peacekeeping Operations affect civil war outcomes. I argue that UNPKOs benefit host governments, and that this is largely due to a selection effect as host governments select into beneficial UNPKOs. I examine the importance of government consent in UNPKO deployment, the relationship between UNPKO presence and government tenure, and the mechanisms through which a government may benefit from a UNPKO.
Published:
How are economics and conflict connected broadly? How about in terms of unemployment and violence? What’s the evidence?
Published:
A first look at the International Crisis Behavior event data. This presentation motivates the project, describes the data collection and cleaning, and provides summary statistics, visualizations, and relations with other ICB characteristics.
Published:
Conflict datasets are explicit about the criteria they are using, but how do we know that they accurately capture what they claim to? How can we compare across conflict datasets when they are using different lenses? We propose using new, massive, semi-structured data such as Wikipedia as a common point of connection to look across different conflict datasets. We match 11 conflict datasets to the wikidata pages that best capture their conflicts. With this, we are able to validate the datasets against each other and identify areas of overlap and possible gaps in their measurement. We discuss what these gaps mean for results based on these datasets.
Published:
What does the landscape of conflict data look like? How do conflict episode datasets compare? How is conflict event data created? How should we evaluate evidence quality and basic science standards?
Undergraduate course TA, Cornell University, 2004
Teaching assistant for chemistry and mathematics during Cornell’s Prefreshman Summer Program, 2004 and 2005.
Undergraduate course TA, Princeton University, Political Science, 2011
Preceptor (TA) for Professor Jacob Shapiro.
Undergraduate course TA, Princeton University, Political Science, 2011
Preceptor (TA) for Professor Gary Bass.
Undergraduate course TA, Princeton University, Political Science, 2013
Preceptor (TA) for Professor Marc Ratkovic.